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Re´sume´ / Abstract
Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international envi-
ronmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders
have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements
to the post-electoral period. However, the cost of participating in these agreements are
often lower for developing countries, and they may benefit from indirect gains, which
may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre-electoral period. These hypotheses
are empirically assessed by studying the ratification process of 48 global environmental
agreements censused in the ENTRI database from 1976 to 1999. We use a duration
model in which time is measured on a daily basis, enabling us to precisely identify
pre- and post-electoral periods – a significant challenge in political cycles studies. Our
investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial
magnitude and non-linear over the pre- and post-electoral years.
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1. Introduction
The provision of an environmental public good with transboundary externalities is subject
to free riding. Cooperation among countries is thus necessary and requires the formation of an
International Environmental Agreement (IEA). Given the absence of a supra-national authority,
IEAs need to be self-enforcing, i.e., profitable and stable (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett,
1994). Barrett (1994) shows that in a basic setting the possible improvement over a situation
without cooperation is limited. This has engendered a large volume of literature aimed at seeking
to understand the determinants of country contributions and to find the best design for IEAs
(see Wagner, 2002; Barrett, 2005; Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013; Eichner and Pethig, 2013, for
reviews and recent developments).
Once the proper design for an IEA has been found and the treaty text drafted, the key step
is to obtain the participation of countries. Participation is sealed through ratification, which
is a political decision resulting from a two-level game (Putnam, 1988; Barrett, 1998). At the
first level, there are negotiations among country representatives. While no influence of foreign
peers is observed by Beron et al. (2003) in the Montreal Protocol ratification process, Murdoch
et al. (2003) find that a country is positively influenced by its polluting neighbors in the case
of the Helsinki Protocol. In a study of 255 IEAs, Bernauer et al. (2010) find evidence that the
ratification of countries from the same region increases the probability to ratify an IEA. Finally,
Sauquet (2012) highlights that, for the case of the Kyoto Protocol, countries are positively
influenced by their trade and investment partners.1
The second level of the game involves negotiations at the national level between domestic
groups and the political leader. Citizen preferences have been shown to depend on revenue level
and the number of green NGOs (Fredriksson et al., 2007). In addition, the possibility of ex-
pressing preferences is determined by a country’s democracy level (Congleton, 1992; Fredriksson
and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002a). Furthermore, the obligations contained in an IEA are
suspected to constrain the behavior of polluting goods producers. Therefore the participation
is expected to be inversely related to the presence of brown lobbies and (possibly) trade open-
1Of course, the design of the IEA influences the presence and nature of interactions, as shown in the articles
we refer to.
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ness, even if supporting evidence is mitigated (Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999; Neumayer, 2002b;
Fredriksson et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, whether domestic (lobbies, citizens) or international (foreign peers), these actors
do not directly influence the participation decision. They are only groups, whose preferences are
considered when the political leader makes his or her decision. Furthermore, theory and evidence
teach us that the decisions of a leader are strongly influenced by his or her reelection prospects
(Nordhaus, 1975; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Drazen and Eslava, 2010,
among others). Thus, we suspect a leader’s propensity to commit to environmental protection
varies over the term, especially prior to and after elections.
To understand the relationship between ratification decisions and the electoral calendar, we
develop an analytical framework reviewing the costs and benefits of the participation in an IEA.
The two hypotheses drawn are empirically tested by studying the ratification process of 48 global
environmental agreements censused in the ENTRI database from 1976 to 1999. We estimate a
duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis and show that the electoral schedule
does have an effect on a country’s probability of ratifying an IEA. Furthermore, we show that
this effect is heterogenous among countries and over pre- and post-electoral years.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, while most of the literature examines how
a democratic leader is influenced by the interest or action of other actors, we examine how a
leader deals with his or her own constraints, that is to say, the electoral calendar. Answering this
question enables us to identify when a leader is more prone to make environmental contributions,
and may thus help to create better conditions for the success of IEAs. Second, unlike previous
studies in this field, we offer to measure time on a daily basis. Indeed, the Cox model allows
us to do so and therefore to exploit precise election and ratification dates to build our variables
of interest, i.e., pre- and post-election dummies. Hence, we avoid traditional weaknesses, such
as poor identification of pre- and post-electoral periods (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004;
Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006). The empirical strategy proposed could
be replicated and is suitable to study a wide range of questions, in particular those involving
policymaker decisions or important events.
Section 2 discusses the theoretical arguments underlying our hypotheses. Our empirical
strategy is developed in Section 3 and results are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Concluding
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remarks are presented in Section 6.
2. Understanding the effects of the electoral calendar
The idea that electoral calendar may impact a leader’s behavior and decisions is far from new.
As early as the 1970’s, Nordhaus (1975) argued that incumbents are likely to boost economic
performance in the pre-electoral period in order to maximize their chances of reelection. However,
empirically, scholars do not find an increase of aggregate economic variables the year before
an election (Alesina et al., 1997; Drazen, 2000), and therefore cast doubt on the existence of
political business cycles. Indeed, as Shi and Svensson (2003) argue, policymakers do not exert
direct control on variables, such as growth or employment, and these global targets are not likely
to have important elasticity to economic stimuli in the short term. By contrast, incumbents can
manipulate fiscal instruments to a greater extent. Thus, academic researchers have thoroughly
studied the political timing of the fiscal tool manipulation, also known as political budget cycles.
Regarding international environmental cooperation, that is sealed through ratification, a
political leader can also choose to act in his or her best interest according to the timing of
elections. This positively answers the question of whether or not leaders are able to adopt
strategic timing ratification behavior. Examining the effect of the electoral calendar on IEA
participation, the following analytical framework explains “why” and “how”. First, we argue
that participation in an environmental treaty can be seen as a costly and thus unpopular policy.
Second, we discuss how incentives for developing and industrialized countries differ.
2.1. IEA purposes and implied costs
The aim of an IEA is to alter the behavior of agents in order to reduce pollution or the
extraction level of natural resources. From this perspective, participation in an environmental
agreement is often perceived as a constraint imposed on domestic economic agents and is some-
times assimilated to the adoption of a new tax (Davies and Naughton, 2013). Moreover, scholars
have shown that increasing taxes or creating a new tax before an election are scarce events.
Such a policy decision usually occurs the year following a major election (Mikesell, 1978; Nelson,
2000; Foremny and Riedel, 2012). Indeed, this is the period farthest from the next election and
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during which the leader is expected to enjoy a “honeymoon period” with strong support and
muted opposition (Nordhaus, 1989; Marra et al., 1990; Haggard and Webb, 1993).2
The industrial sector is likely to be the most strongly affected by this new constraint, and
thus, likely to be its fiercest opponent. Incumbents seeking reelection might be reluctant to
displease industries shortly before elections for two reasons. First, Grossman and Helpman
(2002) explain that industry interests are often represented by powerful and influential lobbies
that provide strong and vital political support through campaign financing.3 The authors point
out that during the 2000 US presidential election, industrial lobbies offered more than 80 million
dollars to the two major political parties, which represents one third of all lobby contributions to
US electoral campaign, and more than 15% of its total cost. Second, industrial companies may
employ thousands of workers in a country. A new tax or regulation that imposes production
constraints may thus threaten jobs as companies seek to minimize costs. The turmoil that might
ensue can be detrimental to the incumbent.4 Obviously, it is easier for a leader to deal with
potential turmoil once reelected to office rather than during the electoral campaign, when his or
her bargaining power may be diminished (Matschke, 2003).
Furthermore, even smaller groups may hold substantial weight on policy-making. For exam-
ple, fishermen are able to block harbors and related activities, farmers can mediatize shocking
public wastage of food, airline employees can seriously impede air traffic (see Osborn, 2003;
Clark, 2013, for examples).5 The media coverage of such events offers these groups a national
audience and makes politicians careful in designing regulations affecting them. Thus, participa-
tion in environmental treaties does not need to be the main concern of ordinary voters to imply
strategic behavior from leaders. We argue that the negative signal potentially sent by the clash
with these groups is likely to persuade incumbents to delay ratification from the campaign or
pre-campaign period to a less critical one, that is, the post-election period.
In summary, IEA participation can impose costs to a country and can be detrimental to
2In the specific case of the environment, Ashworth et al. (2006) show that the adoption of environmental taxes
is delayed from electoral years by Flemish municipalities.
3Although this view is widely accepted Ansolabehere et al. (2003) present some dissonant elements.
4Moreover, concerned workers may hold leaders accountable for not having managed to preserve jobs. This
can ultimately have a detrimental effect on voter perception of the incumbent’s performance and ability, reducing
his or her reelection prospects.
5In particular, fishing-related treaties are numerous and fishers are directly affected by species protection
policies, such as restrictions, quotas and prohibition, or even regulations and norms regarding nets or vessels.
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a leader’s reelection if these costs directly affect a large share of the electorate. However, the
dissatisfaction of a small group can also have great impact. This may favor status quo, especially
when elections approach. Conversely, once the election is over, the pressure on leaders is lower,
and they may even give the pretext of international pressure to adopt environmental standards
that would be difficult to implement nationally (Putnam, 1988). Furthermore, participation is
expected to occur when the distance to the next election is the greatest.
Thus, the first and baseline assumption to test is whether there is a statistically significant
higher probability to ratify an IEA during the period following a major election.
Hypothesis 1. The probability of ratifying an IEA is greater in the post-electoral period.
2.2. Developing country status and net benefits of IEA participation
As pointed in the previous section, environmental commitments are likely to generate costs
for countries. Consequently, developing country leaders called upon their “right to development”,
which is explicitly recognized in the 1992 Rio declaration, and asked to adopt the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibility” in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change. Indeed, it would be unfair for developing countries to pay for a situation
for which, in some cases, they share little responsibility. They also argued that they are fac-
ing other challenges of greater importance, such the alleviation of poverty. When faced with
a choice between ratifying a constraining IEA or not, even an environment-friendly leader is
likely to encounter domestic opposition, such as citizen protests or parliamentary obstruction.
Putnam (1988) explains that this situation can lead to an involuntary defection. Moreover, a
strategic leader may anticipate a case of involuntary defection and negotiates in advance for
softer commitments. As a result, many IEAs distinguish between the obligations of developed
and developing countries (Stone, 2004).
Preferential treatment for poorer countries can take various forms and benefits can eventually
exceed the (reduced) costs of participation. Several examples of direct participation benefits
can be found among the most-famous IEAs. For example, developing countries who ratify
the Kyoto Protocol can host clean development mechanism projects which generate certified
emission reduction credits for developed countries. These projects are also intended to promote
sustainable development in developing countries, through the financing of new projects, and the
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allied technological transfers that might thus ensue. In the Convention on Biological Diversity, or
the REDD+ mechanism, financial inflows are expected, in particular through the development of
win-win solutions, promoting both economic development and environment conservation, such as
payment for environmental services or conditional cash transfers (OCDE, 2013). A last example
is the Basel Convention on hazardous waste shipments that aims at providing environmental
protection and heritage conservation for developing countries through the limitation of hazardous
waste exports. Since costs are markedly reduced and that participation can produce benefits,
ratification can be seen as a welcome reform. Thus, it can drive an incumbent to adopt IEAs in
the run-up period to an election, in order to facilitate his or her reelection.
Not all IEA participation produces direct net benefits for developing countries, however, there
can also be indirect benefits. Indeed, a second aspect affecting a leader’s reelection prospects is
the influence of the international community. Developing country leaders may buy international
support through vote-trading, which can be defined as trading support on one issue for support
on another.6 A recent and important literature on vote-trading shows how developing countries
can trade their votes at the UN Assembly or Council, notably, with some wealthier countries,
such as the US or G7 countries, for obtaining more foreign aid or economic and financial programs
(Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). Interestingly, Rose and Spiegel (2009) and
Schulze and Tosun (2013) show that IEA participation is used to get support on other issues,
such as access to market, credit, and aid.
Leaders of developing countries can trade their participation for two kinds of benefits affecting
their reelection prospects. First, through ratification, they can bargain for policy concessions
on topics likely to boost economic and fiscal performance. Foreign assistance is a prominent
kind of policy concession on which leaders are likely to bargain (De Mesquita and Smith, 2009;
Faye and Niehaus, 2012). Indeed, foreign aid allows the leader to play with fiscal tools to a
greater extent, which is particularly relevant since the political budget cycle literature shows that
fiscal policy is effectively used by developing country incumbents for reinforcing their chances of
reelection. Interestingly, Moreno-Dodson et al. (2012) show that the more aid a leader receives
the greater are his or her chances of staying in office. Incentives for using this “ratification-
6Usually vote-trading describes a transaction involving a vote; in our case there is no vote directly at stake but
rather agreement ratification and international cooperation.
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trading” mechanism are therefore greatest in pre-electoral periods. Furthermore, as some aid
programs are conditional to “good behavior”, it stands to reason that developing country leaders
may be eager to improve their image in the run-up period and use IEA ratification to achieve this.
In addition, the leader of a developing country may attempt to buy credibility and support from
developed country leaders’, by ratifying the agreement they are willing to build (Kelemen and
Vogel, 2010; Schulze and Tosun, 2013). This bargaining mechanism may be of first importance
during electoral periods. Indeed, bad international press and relations are likely to be detrimental
for an incumbent running a competitive election.
As a result, the costs of participation may be prominent for OECD countries, leading policy-
makers to delay ratification until the post-electoral period. Instead, the cost of IEA participation
may be lower and both direct and indirect benefits may be substantial for developing countries.
Consequently, we expect leaders of developing countries to ratify IEAs in the pre-electoral period.
Hypothesis 2. The probability of ratifying an IEA is greater for a developing country during
the pre-electoral period .
3. Identifying the effects of the electoral calendar
3.1. Sample selection
To evaluate how ratification timing can be influenced by the electoral calendar, we lead a
worldwide study which allows us to fully explore the influence of heterogeneity among countries
on this question. We use the ENTRI database and are only interested in treaties with a global
scope.7 Bilateral and regional agreements are excluded from the analysis since they are not open
for ratification to all countries. We also exclude amendments. Indeed, on numerous occasions,
amendments are not subject to explicit ratification. Rather, they must be denounced before
a specific deadline if a country does not want to be bound to them, as with the examples
presented in Descamps et al. (2008). The ratification date for an amendment provided by the
ENTRI database is the aforementioned specific deadline, which is common to all countries.
7The Environmental Treaties and Resources Indicators’ database is provided by the joint efforts of SEDAC
(NASA) and CIESIN (Columbia University) with contributions by IUCN and UNEP, among others. The advantage
of using the ENTRI database is that it is built on several existing sources of information and contains a large
set of information concerning these treaties, in particular the occurrence of succession, which was not available in
alternative databases.
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There would be no point in studying the effect of the electoral cycle based on this date. We
end up with a sample of 48 treaties for the period 1976 to 1999.8 The 48 IEAs included in our
sample concern subjects, such as air and water pollution, biodiversity, hazardous and nuclear
wastes and fishing. Table 1 shows that 33 agreements entered into force from 1978 to 1998, and
on average 29 countries within our 98 country sample are members of these treaties at the end
of the study. A list providing each treaty name, along with its year of entry into force and the
number of countries from our sample that had (already) ratified in 1999 can be found Appendix
A.
Table 1: Main features of IEAs
Obs. mean min max med
Year of opening for ratifica-
tion
48 1987 1976 1999 1989
Year of entry into force 33 1990 1978 1998 1992
Nb. of parties in 1999 (within
our 98 country sample)
48 29 0 84 26
Furthermore, it is only relevant to study the effect of the electoral calendar in cases where
elections are free and fair. If the incumbent is a dictator and certain to stay in office, he has no
strategic incentive to manipulate the timing of reforms (Brender and Drazen, 2005). We use the
Executive and Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC and LIEC, respectively)
provided by the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) and consider an election as “free and
fair” when its index, ranging from 0 to 7, is above 5. We focus on the most relevant national
election according to the country regime. Namely, we rely on presidential ballots for presidential
systems and on legislative elections for parliamentary and mixed regimes.9 As shown in Table 2
our sample of 98 countries is constituted from 23 OECD countries and 75 developing countries.10
Presidential systems are predominantly found in developing countries. A list of countries along
8The choice of the period studied is constrained by the availability of data. Election dates are not available
before 1975 and the ENTRI database ends in 1999.
9This methodological approach is standard in the literature (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen,
2013, for instance). Regimes information is extracted from the “System” variable in DPI. We classify mixed and
parliamentary regimes together since they are not characterized by a strong separation between executive and
legislative powers, as opposed to countries with presidential systems (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
10Some are obviously democratic during subperiods only and so only enter the study during these subperiods.
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with their respective political regime in 1999, is provided in Appendix B.
Table 2: Development status and political regime in 1999
Pres. Parl. Total
PED 54 (72%) 21 (28%) 75 (100%)
OCDE 3 (13%) 20 (87%) 23 (100%)
Total 57 (58%) 41 (42%) 98 (100%)
3.2. Model specification
The ratification process can be seen as a failure time process; units (countries) are observed
from a specific date (the opening of the treaty to ratification), survive for some length of time,
and then fail (ratify) or are censored (have not yet ratified in 1999 ). The time dependence and
censoring inherent to this kind of process (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002) are taken into account
using a duration model.11 We use a Cox proportional hazard model, since it has the advantage
that the functional form of the baseline hazard can be left unspecified.12
Our empirical specification is as follows:
h(t|xj) = h0a(t)αcexp(
K∑
k=1
xkjβk), (1)
where t is the time scale measured in days, and j the unit of observation. The hazard rate
h(t|xj) is the rate at which ratification occurs, given it has not happened until time t (Kiefer,
1988). It depends on the baseline hazard h0(t) which takes into account time dependence and is
common to all countries. We study 48 treaties dealing with different environmental issues. It is
unlikely that the measures against climate change are subjected to the same ratification process
dynamics as the reduction of hazardous waste exports, or the regulation of fishing, for example.
This assumption is relaxed by allowing the baseline hazard to differ by treaty a.
We control for unobserved heterogeneity by introducing a frailty parameter α shared at the
country level c, which can be seen as a random country-specific effect, while several independent
11Duration analysis has also been used to study the determinants of IEAs ratification by Fredriksson and Gaston
(2000), Neumayer (2002b), Fredriksson et al. (2007), and Sauquet (2012). However, to our knowledge this is the
first attempt to use such a model in a multi-treaty setting.
12And, as we will see, stratified. This methodology is superior to the use of a logit model with time splines as
proposed by Beck (1998) and Carter and Signorino (2010) for several reasons, as explained in Section 3.3.
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variables xk are introduced to capture observed heterogeneity.
13 The model presented in equation
1 is expressed in a Proportional Hazard (PH) metric form, which implies that we have the
possibility of reporting regression results in the form of hazard ratios, that are equal to exp(β)
and must be compared to one. For the case of dummy variables, they can be defined as the ratio
of the hazard of an observation with the characteristic A, e.g., being in the post-electoral period,
on the hazard of an observation not having this characteristic. The extension for continuous
variables is straightforward, it is the ratio of the hazards for a 1-unit change in the corresponding
covariate (Cleves et al., 2010, p.131).
The matrix of K independent variables includes election dummies, which are our variables
of interest. They indicate whether the observation is before or after an election, as explained
in the following paragraphs. It also contains three standard independent variables; the GDP
per capita of countries in thousand constant US $2000 (the “GDPpc” variable), the democracy
level (“Polity”) and a measure of trade openness (“Trade”).14 Both revenue and democracy
levels are expected to have a positive effect on commitment whereas theory goes both ways for
trade openness (see Neumayer, 2002b).15 Lastly, ratification days are provided by the ENTRI
database and the election dates (day/month/year) come from the Institutions and Elections
Project (IAEP). Measuring time in days allows us to fully exploit the information contains by
these dates.
It is worth noting that our independent variables vary through time. Let us illustrate how
this translates to our database. Suppose an observed failure time at Day 525 and an independent
variable that changes at the end of the first year (Day 365), such as the GDP per capita of the
country. As explained by Zhou (2001), this is equivalent to two independent observations: one
started at zero but censored at 365; and another started at 365, and observed to fail at 525.
Information concerning a given country-treaty pair will therefore be split into several independent
13In “coxme”, the R routine used to estimate our model, the frailties are estimated using penalized likelihood for
computational facility. See Therneau et al. (2003) for more details. Frailties are preferred to individual dummies
since Allison (2002) and Greene (2004) show that it can bias the estimator. However, introducing individual fixed
effects does not qualitatively change the results (available upon request).
14Revenue level and trade openness measures are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators database.
The democracy level is taken from Polity IV.
15We deliberately limit our set of control variables for several reasons. First, few variables in the literature are
found to be robust in explaining environmental cooperation. Second, an additional variable should be chosen very
carefully since our model may be severely biased by missing observations, especially if they match the ratification
year. Finally, as election dates are strongly exogenous, we do not need to worry about an omitted variable bias.
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observations.
In our database, January 1, 1976 is considered as day 0.16 Then, each treaty enters the
analysis on January 1 of the year the treaty is open to ratification. Each observation ends when
the value of a covariate changes or when the country ratifies the treaty. In this latter case, the
observation ends at the ratification date. As ratification date, we consider the date for which one
of the following instruments has been deposed: accession, acceptance/approval, or ratification.17
We construct time dummies to determine the effect of the electoral calendar. Since the
literature on political cycles usually studies effects that occur within one year before or after an
election, we first build two pre- or post-electoral year dummies. “Pre 365” (“Post 365”) equals 1
on the 365 days preceding (following) election day, and 0 otherwise. These two dummy variables
are used to present baseline results. However, we have reason to believe that a leader’s behavior
is not homogenous over the year preceeding/following the election.
Firstly, there is a latency or ‘transition’ period following a major national election, that may
last several weeks or months. This is due to several factors. First, the actual investiture date of
the leader seldom matches the election day.18 Second, in some countries presidential elections
are followed several weeks later by legislative elections. Conversely, in many parliamentary
countries legislative elections are only the first step of the executive branch renewal process.
Government bodies are only fully functional once both executive and legislative powers are
renewed, and the gap between both may be significant. Last but not least, once each power is
appointed, a short period may be observed for discussing, negotiating, organizing and considering
the implementation of future policies. Consequently, the existence of post-electoral cycles in IEA
ratification is expected to be stronger in the second semester after the election, once the transition
period is over.
Secondly, relying on a strict interpretation of our theoretical mechanisms, leaders of de-
veloping countries should strategically minimize the distance between the ratification and the
upcoming election. We may thus expect them to exhibit the highest cooperative behavior in the
16Indeed, election dates are available only from 1975, so to determine whether or not the period under study is
post-electoral, the analysis must start on January 1, 1976.
17Note that if a country deposes withdrawal or succession instruments, the country-treaty pair is excluded from
the analysis.
18For instance, Barack Obama was elected for the first time on November 4, 2008 but took office only 11 weeks
later, on January 20, 2009.
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six months preceding the ballot.
For those reasons, we offer a more precise analysis of a leader’s strategic behavior by splitting
both the pre- and post-electoral years into two semesters. “Pre S1” takes the value 1 during the
six months preceding the election, i.e., when the distance to the next election is equal to or
lower than 182 days, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, “Pre S2” indicates the first six-month period
of the pre-electoral year, i.e., the second semester before the ballot. It equals 1 between the
365th and 182nd day before an election. “Post S1” and “Post S2” are constructed symmetrically.
“Post S1” is intended to control for the transition period hypothesis and “Post S2” to capture
the post-electoral effect. The estimated equation is as such:
h(t|xj) = h0a(t)αcexp(β1pre S1j + β2pre S2j + β3post S1j + β4post S2j (2)
+β5GDPpcj + β6Polityj + β7Tradej),
Finally, notice that the construction of the four six-month dummies implies a change in the
value of covariates every 6 months before and after an election.19
3.3. Methodological contribution
To analyze the realization of an event such as the ratification of a treaty, traditional logit
models are not suitable since they do not take into account time dependence, leading to violation
of the assumption of independence among observations. Beck (1998) and Carter and Signorino
(2010) highlight this point and suggest tackling time dependence in the logit model through the
introduction of time dummies or time splines. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model,
since it improves this empirical strategy in two ways.
First, it allows us to take into account time dependence and to achieve it without imposing
any inflexible functional form on the effect of time. Moreover, through stratification, the baseline
hazard is allowed to vary among treaties. In addition, this methodology allows us to account for
country-specific effects through the introduction of a frailty term shared at the country level.
19To clearly demonstrate the implications for the database construction and to allow a better understanding of
our empirical contribution, we have developed an example in Appendix C.
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Second and most important, while a logit model would have implied using yearly observations,
the Cox model allows to measure the time continuously (in days, in our case). This is particularly
important for our question of interest. Indeed, in the traditional analysis of political cycles,
the architecture of the data leads researchers to consider the calendar year of election as the
electoral year and the preceding and following calendar years as pre-/post-election periods. Yet,
if an election occurs on January 5, for example, most of the “election” year is, in reality, a post-
electoral period. This “poor identification”of pre- and post-electoral periods has been recognized
in many leading articles on political cycles (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Brender and
Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006). Through our analysis, and as suggested in the previous
section, we avoid this bias and are able to truly distinguish between pre- and post-election
periods. We illustrate this point and present examples of identification gains allowed by the use
of the Cox model in Figure 1.
In Case 1, Figure 1, we see that the conventional dummy does not capture a ratification
occurring 8 months after an election as a post-electoral year event. In Case 2, the participation
decision happening 23 months after an election is (wrongly) considered as still post-electoral.
This has very little relevance, especially for countries like the US, which have 4-year terms. In
Case 3, we see that we are able to isolate the investiture period by splitting the post-electoral
dummy into two semesters and thereby capture true post-electoral behavior.
[insert Figure 1 here]
4. Baseline results
We now empirically assess whether ratification decisions are subject to strategic timing on
the part of leaders and test for the hypotheses developed in Section 2. We run regressions on
a dataset of 98 democratic countries that have the choice to commit to 48 IEAs during the
period 1976-1999. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model and report hazard ratios. As
explained in Section 3.2, a hazard ratio above 1 means that an increase in the covariate induces
an increase of the hazard.
We present our baseline results in Table 3. In columns (1) to (3), we introduce dummy
variables taking the value of 1 for one year before/after an election. We then run more precise
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estimates, by using pre- and post-election semesters dummies as specified in equation 2, and
present results in columns (4) to (6). The structure within these two series of regressions is
identical. We first report estimates made on the whole sample that we then split into OECD
countries on one hand and developing countries on the other hand.20
[insert table 3 here]
Column (1) reveals that the ratification hazard is higher in the pre-electoral year. In accor-
dance with our expectations, this pre-electoral cycle is found to be actually driven by the group
of developing countries, column (3). According to the baseline regression column (2), OECD
members do not exhibit any significant pre- or post-electoral cycles. This partly rejects our first
hypothesis. Yet, the post-electoral year coefficient is positive and the associated p-value (0.12)
only slightly exceeds the usual significance threshold of 10 percent. We attribute this mixed
evidence to the phenomenon raised in Section 3.3. Namely, the first period just after elections
is likely to be a transition period characterized by a low production rate of laws and policies.
The examination of Table 3’s last three columns supports this view and brings back together
our theoretical predictions and empirical investigation.
Columns (5) and (6) exhibit strong effects, both in magnitude and significance. OECD
leaders tend to strategically delay ratification to the second post-election semester; the hazard
increases by 31%. By contrast, we do not observe any significant cycle occurring during the
first semester, which is consistent with the fact that political institutions need time to renew,
re-organize, and become effective again. For developing countries we see that the ratification
rate increases in the pre-electoral period and is even concentrated in the six months preceding
elections. This suggests that leaders of developing countries tend to ratify closer to elections in
order to maximize the positive impact (in terms of reelection prospects) they may obtain from
their participation. Consequently, these results support the theoretical mechanisms previously
developed and Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not rejected.
Finally, all of our control variables affect international cooperation in the direction expected,
but none exhibits systematic effects. Trade openness never becomes significant. Democracy
20For brevity, we only present results from the full model, taking into account both country and treaty hetero-
geneity that we believe to be more conservative and rigorous. Not controlling for these heterogeneities does not,
however, qualitatively affect our results. These results are not reported but are available upon request.
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increases ratification likelihood over the whole sample but this effect disappears once the sample
is split. This may indicate a substantial polarization of the two country groups in this respect.
Only GDP per capita offers more stable results. Wealthier countries are more willing to par-
ticipate in environmental agreements. This result is, however, not significant for the OECD
group suggesting a positive impact of the revenue level up to certain threshold. To provide a
better picture, a GDP per capita gain of 1000 dollars in a developing country leads to a rise in
the hazard by 14%. Notice that for the very same country, being in the six-month period just
preceding an election has a substantially greater effect, i.e, an increase in the hazard by 36%.21
5. Robustness checks
As shown, our baseline results mostly support our theoretical predictions, i.e., that leaders
have specific incentives to adopt strategic-timing ratification behavior. In this next section, we
study potential concerns about the validity of these predictions. This is done in two steps.
First, we use alternative variables in order to ensure that our results are not sample-dependent.
Second, we assess the relevance of alternative explanations that may partly explain or drive the
results.
5.1. Relevant information
5.1.1. Who’s democratic?
We initially chose the election competitiveness index from the DPI database to identify which
countries can be considered democratic. Capturing the “free and fair” nature of elections, this
index allows us to restrict our sample to countries where a leader’s reelection can be credibly
challenged.22 Nevertheless, we now offer to rely on a broader definition of democracy and switch
to the most widely used indicator of democracy provided by the Polity IV project. This variable
is coded from -10 for the least democratic to 10 for the most democratic states. Relying on
common practice, we restrict our sample only to observations that score a strictly positive value.
The two indexes exhibit a rather moderate correlation coefficient of 0.65. This implies only
21Finally, note that excluding control variables does not significantly affect our results.
22That is to say cases for which leaders may have real incentives to behave strategically and therefore for which
our theoretical mechanisms are actually relevant (as in Brender and Drazen, 2005).
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marginal changes in the sample for OECD countries, but substantial changes for developing
countries, since 11 countries were dropped from the sample when using Polity IV to identify
democratic countries. Adopting this alternative criterion to select our sample, we replicate the
last two columns of Table 3 and report results in the first two columns of Table 4.
[insert table 4 here]
Results remain unaffected by this change. They still suggest that OECD leaders tend to
delay costly international cooperation decisions to the post-election period. Conversely, leaders
of developing countries, benefiting notably from lower participation costs, are more prone to
ratify just before elections in an attempt to reinforce their reelection prospects.
5.1.2. Who’s the ratifier?
Until now we have considered the most relevant elections according to country regime types,
that is, legislative (executive) elections for parliamentary (presidential) regimes. However, the
authority of ratification may belong to a specific body, irrespective of the country’s regime type.
We now determine the relevant national election according to who is in charge of ratification.
To do so, we rely on the work of Simmons (2009), who develops a classification to identify the
ratifier, or more precisely, the institutional ratification process for a given country. A score of 1
to 3 is assigned to each country based on its respective constitution. The greater the score, the
greater are the hurdles to executive willingness to ratify. A value of 1 means that the ratification
decision relies exclusively on the chief executive, 1.5 means there is a rule or tradition for the
executive to inform the legislative body of signed treaties, 2 that a majority consent from a
legislative body is required, and 3 that a stricter consensus may be needed through a stronger
majority or the approval of several legislative bodies.23,24
In the regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we focus on executive elections
for countries coded 1 and 1.5, and on legislative elections for the others.25 Results are similar
23A score of 4 would correspond to a “national plebiscite” rule, but no country has adopted such a process.
24Interested readers may find more details in Appendix 3.2 (Ratification rules) of Beth Simmons’ book.
251.5-score countries follow a “rule or tradition of informing the legislative body of signed treaties”. Even
if legislative assent is not requested, which body has a greater influence over this decision may be ambiguous.
Moreover, as most countries concerned by this issue are parliamentary (Australia, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, New
Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, but Malawi and Peru), the legislative power is likely to exert substantive
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to the baseline ones; we simply remark that the probability of ratification in the six months
before election in developing countries is even reinforced. More precisely, during this period, for
developing countries the hazard is 45% higher than in other periods of the term. Finally, the
last two columns of Table 4 combine the first two robustness checks. The two hypotheses drawn
from the analytical framework are still supported.26
5.2. Alternative explanations
A second threat to the validity of our results is omitted variables. Is this section, we control
for two important alternative explanations of the existence of opportunistic ratification cycles:
economic conditions and partisan politics.
5.2.1. Economically driven cycles
In good economic times, a decision implying short-term costs versus long-term benefits, such
as environmental protection, is easier to sell to the population. Thus, if leaders manage to
boost the economy during the year preceding elections (Nordhaus, 1975), this may also create
a favourable context for environmental cooperation and thus increase participation in the pre-
electoral period. In particular, this scenario would bias and (partly) explain the result we found
for developing countries. As mentioned in Section 2, evidence on the existence of such political
business cycles is rather poorly conclusive. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that it does
not drive our results. We introduce the annual GDP growth rate for each country and present
the results in column (1) and (2) of Table 5.27
We see that the growth variable is not significant and that the variables of interest are not
affected by the introduction of the GDP growth rate. Ratification probability is still higher in
the second semester after elections in OECD countries, and, more importantly, during the six-
month period preceding elections in developing countries. To sum up, we show that the electoral
ratification cycle we highlight is driven by political incentives and not economic forces.
control over the chief executive it has elected or appointed. However, classifying these countries in one of the two
groups does not affect the main results (not reported but available).
26When we simultaneously use Polity IV to identify democratic countries and Beth Simmons’ work to select
the relevant elections, we observe a decrease in the probability to ratify an IEA during the second semester after
an election for developing countries. This result is compatible with our predictions but we do not give it much
importance since the associated coefficient is only weakly significant and does not statistically differ from 0 in any
other regression we run.
27Growth rates are extracted from the World Bank Development Indicators database.
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5.2.2. Opportunistic versus partisan cycles
We conclude by ensuring that our results are truly driven by strategic timing behavior on
the part of leaders. The literature discusses two kinds of political cycles, namely partisan and
opportunistic cycles. The theoretical mechanisms we develop in Section 2 clearly lie in the
second category. However, we may imagine that the emergence of political cycles is actually
led by the alternation of competing political parties in office and the difference of preferences
between them. In that case, ratification in the post-electoral period would not reflect strategic
timing in decision-making, but rather a (partisan) public policy that a party had wanted to
implement for a long time, but had not had the power to achieve it sooner.28
To examine such a possibility, we construct a variable “Newparty” taking the value of 1
for terms characterized by political party alternation following an election, and 0 otherwise.29
Since only OECD countries exhibit positive post-electoral cycles, we focus on this sub-sample of
countries.30 We use successively the regime type and the ratifier affiliations to determine which
relevant kind of election to focus on for each country. Results are reported in columns (3) to (8)
of Table 5.
[insert table 5 here]
The results in column (3) suggest that a change in party leader implies a lower intensity
level of cooperation all along the related term. This finding is, however, not robust and seems to
be explained by the absence of the “Post S1*newparty” interaction term that exhibits a strong
effect in the other regressions. The subsequent estimates indicate that a change of the party
in office has a negative effect on the ratification probability of an OECD country during the
six months following an election. This finding may appear to be consistent with the “transition
period” hypothesis. Yet, why it occurs only in the case of change in the leading party is still
puzzling. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient impels us to dedicate attention to this
28This mechanism is well illustrated by the New-Zealand Government’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Yang,
2004) that occurred after the 2002 election, won by the pro-ratification labour-led party, which was opposed the
conservative party.
29To do so, we use election dates to delimitate mandates and the variable “PRTYIN” from DPI, that indicates
how long the chief executive’s party has been in office, to identify changes in the party in power.
30It would be pointless to study partisan driven pre-electoral cycles, i.e., effects of political party changes before
they actually occur.
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result. The hazard is 60% lower in the first semester after an election, which is quite substantial.
Meanwhile, the coefficient associated with the“Post S2”variable, indicating effects related to the
second semester after elections for parties remaining in power, is still above one and significant.
This means that reelected or reappointed chief executives - and even new ones belonging to the
same party as the previous incumbent - tend to ratify more during the second half of the term’s
first-year.
Taken together, these findings reveal that new leaders (or administrations) are not prone to
engage themselves rapidly in IEAs once in power but rather tend to reduce their participation
in the beginning of their terms, whereas renewed administrations are likely to increase partici-
pation.31 These results echo back to the recent work of Brender and Drazen (2013) in which the
authors show that new leaders tend to delay policy changes. In particular, the authors argue
that leaders may face a learning curve in both the exercise of power and the discernment of pop-
ulation preferences. Thus new leaders may be reluctant to ratify treaties during the first year
of their term and more prone to do so over the medium-term. This interpretation is consistent
with the fact that “Newparty” is not significant, indicating that on average new and reelected
leaders do not significantly differ in their cooperation behavior over the duration of their terms.
To summarize, it appears that the post-electoral cycle highlighted in OECD countries is
attributable to opportunistic behavior from leaders rather than to partisan politics, and thus,
are due to strategic-timing in reform adoption.
6. Conclusion
Elections are acknowledged as one of the most prominent political factors affecting a leader’s
behavior. Yet, to our knowledge no paper has studied the ways in which the electoral calendar
affects international environmental cooperation. We attempt to fill this gap by assessing when
leaders are more likely to ratify IEAs. Estimating a duration model with time-varying covariates,
we show that elections appear to impact ratification timing. Economic and political costs induced
by IEA commitments push OECD country incumbents to delay ratification until after an election
in order not to deter their reelection prospects. Due to an institutional transition period, the
31During the first and second semester after an election, respectively.
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commitment peak is observed during the second post-election semester. By contrast, developing
countries benefit from preferential treatment that both reduces costs and increases gains of IEA
participation. Therefore, leaders of developing countries tend to use ratification as a pre-electoral
tool to boost their chances to stay in office. We find this effect to be apparent in the last six-
month period preceding an election. These findings appear to be substantial and robust, and
are found using an empirical strategy that allows clear identification of pre- and post- electoral
periods.
These results deepen our understanding of international cooperation and offer some avenues
to enhancing it. First, these results could help stakeholders such as international organizations
or NGOs to target periods during which leaders are in a better position to support their requests.
Second, while our paper focuses on the ratification stage, its conclusions may serve to determine
the optimal time to organize international conferences and summits. Treaties are drafted during
this upstream stage making it crucial for their success. Naturally, since the timing of national
elections across the world are independent it is highly unlikely that one point in time would
correspond to the optimal period for all leaders. However, some points in time are more likely
than others to be suitable, if they put more countries or key countries in the position sought.
Furthermore, this will be easier in regional and even bilateral agreements. All these points
open avenues for applications, as well as for further research aimed at enhancing environmental
policies and international cooperation.
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Appendix A: List of treaties
Treaty name Year of
opening
for ratifi-
cation
Year of
entry into
force
Nb parties
Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships (No. 147) 1976 1981 20
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 1986 18
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques
1976 1978 28
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage
1976 1981 24
Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
1976 1994 19
Convention concerning the Protection of Workers against Occupational Haz-
ards in the Working Environment due to Air Pollution
1977 1979 17
International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels 1977 10
Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978 1992 3
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ( MAR-
POL ) - Annex IV (Optional): Sewage
1978 - 30
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Hazardous
substances carried in packaged form
1978 1992 39
International Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watch-
keeping for Seafarers
1978 1984 48
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
( SOLAS Prot.)
1978 1981 32
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 1979 1985 44
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1979 1983 32
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1979 1987 30
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 1994 48
International Tropical Timber Agreement (Geneva 1983) 1983 1985 30
Statutes of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnol-
ogy
1983 1994 22
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 1988 72
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency
1986 1987 38
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1986 1987 42
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 1989 72
Joint Protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the
Paris Convention
1988 1992 11
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS PROT 1988)
1988 - 16
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal
1989 1992 71
International Convention on Salvage 1989 1996 15
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Co-
operation
1990 1995 27
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Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991 1997 18
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (con-
solidated version)
1991 1998 9
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 1993 82
Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992 - 8
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 1994 84
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Man-
agement Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
1993 - 6
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
1993 1997 69
Protocol to the International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels 1993 - 3
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
1994 1996 47
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994 1996 34
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Expe-
riencing Serious Drought and or Desertification
1994 1996 81
International Tropical Timber Agreement (Geneva 1994) 1994 1997 27
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Manage-
ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
1995 - 6
Comprehensive Nuclear Test - Ban Treaty 1996 32
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Con-
nection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea
1996 - 0
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter
1996 - 4
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1997 - 0
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management
1997 - 4
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
1997 - 3
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
1998 - 0
International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 - 0
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Appendix B: List of countries
Country name dpi BS Country name dpi BS Country name dpi BS
Albania 2 2 Ethiopia 2 2 Nicaragua 1 2
Algeria 1 1 Finland* 2 2 Niger 1 1
Angola 1 2 France* 2 2 Nigeria 1 2
Argentina 1 2 Gabon 1 2 Norway* 2 1
Australia* 2 1 Gambia 1 2 Pakistan 2 1
Austria* 2 2 Ghana 1 2 Panama 1 2
Azerbaijan 1 2 Greece* 2 2 Paraguay 1 2
Bangladesh 2 2 Guatemala 1 1 Peru 1 1
Belgium* 2 2 Guinea 1 2 Philippines 1 2
Benin 1 1 Honduras 1 2 Poland* 1 2
Bolivia 1 2 Hungary* 2 2 Portugal* 2 2
Botswana 2 1 India 2 1 Romania 2 2
Brazil 1 2 Indonesia 2 2 Senegal 1 1
Bulgaria 2 2 Ireland* 2 2 Sierra leone 1 2
Burkina faso 1 1 Israel* 1 2 South africa 2 1
Burundi 1 1 Italy* 2 2 Spain* 2 2
Cambodia 2 2 Japan* 2 2 Sri lanka 1 1
Cameroon 1 2 Kenya 1 1 Sudan 1 2
Canada* 2 1 Latvia 2 2 Sweden* 2 2
Central african republic 1 2 Lesotho 2 1 Switzerland* 2 2
Chad 1 2 Liberia 1 2 Tanzania 1 1
Chile 1 2 Madagascar 1 1 Thailand 2 1
Colombia 1 2 Malawi 1 1 Togo 2 1
Congo 1 2 Malaysia 2 2 Turkey 2 2
Costa rica 1 2 Mali 1 1 Uganda 1 2
Cote d’ivoire 1 Mauritania 1 2 United kingdom* 2 1
Denmark* 2 2 Moldova 1 2 United states* 1 2
Djibouti 1 2 Mongolia 1 2 Uruguay 1 2
Dominican republic 1 2 Mozambique 1 2 Venezuela 1 2
Mexico 1 2 Namibia 1 2 Yemen 2 2
Ecuador 1 2 Nepal 2 2 Zambia 1 1
Egypt 2 1 Netherlands* 2 2 Zimbabwe 2 1
El salvador 1 2 New zealand* 2 1
Notes: A “*” associated with a country name means that it is a member of the OECD in 1999. A value of 1 means
the presidential election was relevant while 2 means the legislative election was relevant, according to the World
Bank (column “dpi”) or the work of Beth Simmons (column “BS”). This information is valid for the year 1999
too.
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Appendix C: Example of database construction
Remark that the construction of the four six-month dummies implies a change in the value of covariates
every 6 months before and after an election. To clearly see the implications for the database construction
and the methodological contribution it allows, let us take an example. We observe a country c, ratifying
a treaty a. The analysis starts on January 1st 1976 (day 0). There is an election in this country on the
the July 24th 1980 (day 1600). The country ratifies on the November 27th 1981 (day 2156). This leads
to the set of observations presented in the following Table for this case.
Database construction example
year day start day end ratif. Pre S2 Pre S1 Post S1 Post S2 GDPpc
1976 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 1000
1977 365 730 0 0 0 0 0 900
1978 730 1095 0 0 0 0 0 1100
1979 1095 1235 0 0 0 0 0 1150
1979 1235 1460 0 1 0 0 0 1150
1980 1460 1518 0 1 0 0 0 1160
1980 1518 1600 0 0 1 0 0 1160
1980 1600 1782 0 0 0 1 0 1160
1980 1782 1825 0 0 0 0 1 1160
1981 1825 1965 0 0 0 0 1 1200
1981 1965 2156 1 0 0 0 0 1200
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Table 3: IEAs ratification determinants (Cox PH model) - Main results
Year dummies Semester Dummies
Whole sample OECD DCs Whole sample OECD DCs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre 365 1.119* 1.121 1.214** - - -
(0.067) (0.103) (0.092)
Post 365 0.991 1.173 0.865 - - -
(0.069) (0.102) (0.098)
Pre S2 - - - 1.063 1.152 1.082
(0.086) (0.130) (0.122)
Pre S1 - - - 1.177* 1.092 1.356***
(0.085) (0.133) (0.115)
Post S1 - - - 0.908 1.013 0.877
(0.092) (0.139) (0.129)
Post S2 - - - 1.077 1.312** 0.865
(0.085) (0.121) (0.128)
GDPpc 1.051*** 1.016 1.141*** 1.051*** 1.017 1.142***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.049) (0.007) (0.016) (0.049)
Polity 1.032*** 0.884 1.01 1.033*** 0.886 1.01
(0.011) (0.138) (0.012) (0.011) (0.137) (0.012)
Trade 0.999 1.002 0.997 0.999 1.002 0.997
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Nb. Obs. 52,307 14,688 37,619 66,247 19,136 47,111
Nb. Countries 98 23 75 98 23 75
Nb. Events 1,375 605 770 1,375 605 770
Notes: Cox PH estimations with frailty shared at the country level and stratification of the baseline hazard by treaties. ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant
at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. Standard errors associated with the reported hazard ratios are in parentheses.
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Table 4: IEAs ratification determinants (Cox PH model) - Relevant information
Polity IV Ratifiers’ elections Polity IV & Ratifiers’ elections
OECD DCs OECD DCs OECD DCs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre S2 1.144 1.132 1.151 1.190 1.149 1.240
(0.129) (0.135) (0.143) (0.124) (0.142) (0.136)
Pre S1 1.107 1.339** 0.826 1.447*** 0.945 1.478***
(0.132) (0.127) (0.152) (0.119) (0.151) (0.127)
Post S1 1.022 0.888 0.888 0.916 0.900 0.960
(0.138) (0.142) (0.155) (0.138) (0.154) (0.148)
Post S2 1.311** 0.942 1.304** 0.811 1.311** 0.731*
(0.120) (0.141) (0.130) (0.139) (0.130) (0.048)
GDPpc 1.017 1.177*** 1.017 1.134** 1.016 1.165***
(0.016) (0.047) (0.016) (0.052) (0.016) (0.048)
Polity 0.923 1.028 0.901 1.017 0.935 1.028
(0.108) (0.028) (0.138) (0.012) (0.109) (0.028)
Trade 1.001 0.998 1.002 0.998 1.001 0.998
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Nb. Obs. 19237 37044 17404 45386 17534 36219
Nb. Countries 23 64 23 76 23 64
Nb. Events 608 601 605 762 608 601
Notes: ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. Standard errors associated with the reported hazard ratios are in
parentheses. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present estimation of a Cox proportional hazard model on a sample of democratic countries. In columns (4), (5) and (6), the
Cox model is stratified by treaty and a frailty term shared at the country level is introduced.
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Table 5: IEAs ratification determinants (Cox PH model) - Alternative explanations
Growth Party change - Regimes’ elections Party Change - Ratifiers’ elections
OECD DCs OECD countries OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre S1 1.091 1.379*** 1.052 1.057 1.060 0.947 0.947 0.952
(0.133) (0.115) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157)
Pre S2 1.154 1.098 1.113 1.115 1.123 1.126 1.117 1.132
(0.130) (0.122) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Post S1 1.014 0.892 0.924 1.231 1.251 0.768 1.082 1.110
(0.139) (0.129) (0.149) (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) (0.195) (0.196)
Post S2 1.313*** 0.884 1.345** 1.282** 1.140** 1.391** 1.279* 1.456**
(0.121) (0.128) (0.151) (0.126) (0.152) (0.166) (0.139) (0.167)
Post S1*newparty - - - 0.407*** 0.380*** - 0.355*** 0.319***
(0.322) (0.329) (0.369) (0.378)
Post S2*newparty - - 0.931 - 0.778 0.848 - 0.687
(0.252) (0.258) (0.277) (0.283)
Newparty - - 0.756** 0.853 0.912 0.945 1.051 1.175
(0.132) (0.127) (0.143) (0.153) (0.143) (0.164)
GDPpc 1.018 1.136*** 1.015 1.014 1.014 1.015 1.015 1.015
(0.016) (0.051) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Polity 0.930 1.015 0.864 0.865 0.869 0.867 0.871 0.879
(0.158) (0.012) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Trade 1.003 0.998 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Growth 0.977 1.005 - - - - - -
(0.026) (0.007)
Nb. Obs. 19,048 47,587 18,116 18,116 18,116 18,745 18,745 18,745
Nb. Countries 23 75 23 23 23 23 23 23
Nb. Events 602 773 569 569 569 569 569 569
Notes: ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. Standard errors associated with the reported hazard ratios are in parentheses. Columns
(1), (2) and (3) present estimation of a Cox proportional hazard model on a sample of democratic countries. In columns (4), (5) and (6), the Cox model is stratified by treaty and a frailty
term shared at the country level is introduced.
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Figure 1: Identification gains
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